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Appellants UMG Recordings, Inc.; et al., (collectively “UMG”) 
respectfully seek rehearing and suggest rehearing en banc of the panel decision 
(“Opinion”) in UMG Recordings, Inc., et al. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. (“Veoh”), 
et al., No. 09-56777. 
This has been one of the most closely watched and anticipated copyright 
cases in years.  For good reason.  The appeal raises important questions of first 
impression concerning the protection and enforcement of copyrights on the 
internet.  It is vital that these issues be correctly resolved and that the Court 
provide guidance on the scope of the “safe harbors” to copyright liability 
created in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).  The panel’s new 
decision – which replaces the panel’s original December 2011 decision – 
accomplishes neither goal.   
The new opinion effectively rewrites the DMCA to provide different 
rules for copyright infringement on the internet.  It improperly shifts the burden 
of online copyright enforcement to content owners whose businesses depend 
on payment for the use of their works, while broadly shielding internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) who use and reap financial benefits from those works 
(without compensating their owners) even when they have the right and ability 
to police their sites.  The Opinion upends the carefully-crafted balance 
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embodied in Section 512 of the Copyright Act.  And, as explained below, the 
Opinion fails to clarify the limits or scope of the DMCA’s “safe harbors.”   
The flaws in the Opinion include:  first, the holding that section 512(c)’s 
safe harbor for infringement “by reason of the storage at the direction of a 
user” actually encompasses all “access-facilitating processes that automatically 
occur when a user” uploads, streams or downloads infringing material 
eviscerates both the language and structure of the DMCA.  Congress created 
four discrete safe harbors, each addressing different activities.  After the 
Opinion, Section 512(c), now applicable to “access-facilitating processes,” 
swallows several of the other supposedly different and discrete safe harbors 
whole.   
Second, the Opinion ignores longstanding copyright law to hold that an 
ISP does not have either actual or red flag knowledge of infringement unless it 
has received information identifying “specific instances of infringement.”  
Section 512(c)(1)(A) requires no such thing.  As a result, content owners must 
now incur the expense of continuously scouring hundreds of thousands (or 
indeed millions) of constantly changing internet websites, to attempt to locate 
copies of their works and then send take-down notices or otherwise advise ISPs 
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of these “specific instances of infringement” on their sites.1  The Opinion 
requires a world wide web game of “Whack-A-Mole” to police infringement.    
Third, as a consequence of the Opinion’s interpretation of Section 
512(c)(1)(B), websites like Veoh, which (a) copy, perform, and distribute (by 
offering digital downloads), tens of thousands of infringing works, (b) receive 
a direct financial benefit from the infringement in the form of advertising 
revenues that directly increase with each view of an infringing video by a user, 
and (c) have the “right and ability to control” the infringement as those terms 
have historically been understood in copyright law, nevertheless get a free pass 
under the DMCA unless they also engage in an undefined “something more” -- 
which apparently must be akin to inducing infringement.  If the Opinion is left 
standing, ISPs like Veoh will have no obligation either to affirmatively police 
their site (indeed, they are disincentivized from doing so lest they find an 
infringing file which would give them “actual” or red flag knowledge), to 
adopt readily available technical solutions to mitigate infringement, or to 
obtain authorization from content owners.   
                                           
1 As discussed below, the Opinion arrived at this incorrect conclusion 
largely by misapplying language from the ‘Court’s decision in Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) to fashion a rule that ISPs are not 
obliged, even in the face of red flag knowledge, to investigate infringement. 
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Simply, the Opinion improperly and improvidently rewrote the DMCA, 
and the Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc should be granted. 
BACKGROUND 
Veoh operated an internet service designed to derive advertising revenue 
from video content.  Veoh encouraged millions of users to upload videos, and 
then distributed those videos to the entire world – for free.  Among them were 
thousands of copyrighted works of UMG.  Veoh did this by copying videos 
uploaded by its users into different formats and then making them available for 
unlimited, on-demand viewing through Veoh’s internet site, and also by 
consciously including a “download button” (YouTube, for example, had no 
such feature) which allowed anyone to make a perfect, permanent, digital copy 
– just like the legal copy consumers can purchase of a copyrighted video 
through Apple’s iTunes store.  Veoh monetized these videos for itself, not 
content owners.  Veoh sold advertising to accompany the videos.  The more 
viewers the content attracted, the more ads Veoh displayed and the more 
money it made.  And Veoh knew that professionally-produced copyrighted 
videos, like UMG’s, drew viewers to its site.  Veoh did not pay for the content 
it distributed, and made no effort to obtain permission from the creators of that 
content.  For years, until after it was sued and the case was on the eve of trial, 
Veoh consciously eschewed readily-available technology to limit its 
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widespread copyright infringement.  Knowing filtering would harm its business 
by eliminating the copyrighted files that drew users to its site, Veoh delayed 
licensing and applying effective filtering technology (offered by Audible 
Magic) that would have permitted Veoh to identify popular copyrighted 
material on its servers, and then remove it.2  
ARGUMENT 
A. The Opinion renders the limiting language of the 512(c) safe 
harbor --  “infringement of copyright by reason of the storage 
at the direction of a user. . .” -- meaningless. 
Congress enacted the DMCA, including Section 512 in 1998.  Section 
512 created an exception to the general principles of the Copyright Act for 
certain ISPs.  It created four “safe harbors” for discrete activities.  Section 
512(c) limits liability for “infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at 
the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”  Supreme Court 
precedent holds that exceptions (like Section 512(c)) to laws of general 
applicability must be construed narrowly.3  In derogation of this principle, the 
                                           
2 In contrast, Veoh vigorously screened for pornography, since those 
videos, unlike copyrighted content, were antithetical to its business plan.  See, 
e.g., RE 924-25, 1233-35, 2011-13. 
3 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 
(1989) (“In construing provisions . . ., in which a general statement of policy is 
qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to 
preserve the primary operation of the provision.”); A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. 
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language of the statute, its legislative history, and other principles of statutory 
interpretation, the Opinion interpreted this provision broadly to encompass “the 
access-facilitating processes that automatically occur when a user uploads a 
video to Veoh.”4  The Opinion does not clearly demarcate what web activity, if 
any, would go beyond its broad definition of “by reason of the storage” and its 
articulated standard incorrectly expands the scope of the exception far beyond 
what Congress intended. 
In Section 512(c), Congress employed language with a particular 
meaning.  Federal statutes use the phrase “by reason of” to connote narrow, 
proximate causation.5  Infringement “by reason of the storage” means what it 
says – the storage must be the proximate cause of the infringement.  The 
Opinion rejects this straightforward interpretation and expands the statutory 
language to include infringement resulting from many activities separate from 
storage, including Veoh’s infringement by reason of distributing  copies (i.e., 
digital downloads) of stored material.  Nothing in the statutory language or its 
legislative history supports this expansive interpretation.     
                                                                                                                                 
Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (“To extend an exemption to other than 
those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the 
interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”). 
4 Opinion at 19-20. 
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The Opinion unduly relies on Section 512(k)’s broad definition of 
“service provider” to support its interpretation of “by reason of the storage.”  
This definition merely identifies entities that might qualify for a “safe harbor” 
for particular activities.  It says nothing about the definition of “storage.”  To 
the contrary, had Congress intended all “access-facilitating” activities of 
qualifying ISPs to be protected, it would not have defined precise “safe 
harbors” in Sections 512(a)-(d).   
The Opinion’s interpretation wreaks havoc on the structure of the statute.  
It expands the narrow Section 512(c) “safe harbor” to encompass activities 
specifically addressed by the other, inapplicable “safe harbors.”  For example, 
the Opinion’s interpretation would encompass transmission of stored material 
within Section 512(c), even though Congress created a separate “safe harbor” 
with separate requirements for transmission in Section 512(a) and made clear 
that the “safe harbors” were to be understood as separate in Section 512(n).6  If 
Veoh seeks protection for transmission activities, it should prove that those 
activities meet the Section 512(a) standard, not sweep them in through some 
“by reason of the storage” catch-all.  
                                                                                                                                 
5 See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-
68 (1992) (Clayton Act and RICO statute); Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New 
York, 559 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010) (RICO statute). 
6 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105-190, 1998 WL 239623, *51 (1998). 
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B. The Opinion eviscerates the “red flag” knowledge standard of 
Section 512(c)(1)(A). 
In Section 512(c)(1)(A), Congress differentiated between two discrete 
circumstances in which an ISP would lose immunity.  To invoke immunity 
from damages, an ISP must prove that it: (i) “does not have actual knowledge 
that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is 
infringing”, or (ii) “in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent[.]”   
The Opinion construed these provisions as follows:  “The DMCA 
recognizes that service providers who do not locate and remove infringing 
materials they do not specifically know of should not suffer the loss of safe 
harbor protection.”7  Likewise, the Opinion approvingly quoted the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion in Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, Inc.,676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 
2012) (“Viacom”)  that: “both [512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (A)(ii)] . . . apply only to 
specific instances of infringement.”8  The Opinion’s holding that both the 
actual and the red flag knowledge provisions require knowledge of specific 
instances of infringement is wrong.  Imposing this requirement on the “red 
flag” test of Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) contradicts its clear statutory language 
                                           
7 Opinion at 34 (emphasis added). 
8 Opinion at 39, quoting Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31. 
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and guts the provision.  This conclusion (stated in both the original and new 
Opinion) has rightly been criticized by leading commentators.9   
The language and structure of the statute belie the conclusion that 
Congress mandated that an ISP must have knowledge of specific instances of 
infringement.  Congress intended that the “red flag” knowledge section would 
not require knowledge of infringement of specific copyrighted works.  Section 
512(c)(1)(A)(i) requires actual knowledge “that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing.”  (emphasis added).  
But the red flag knowledge provision, Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), eschews 
references to “the material” in favor of far broader language – “aware[ness] of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” – that is 
irreconcilable with a requirement of knowledge of “specific instances of 
infringement.”  (emphasis added). 
                                           
9 See, e.g., 3 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright § 12B.04[A][1][b] (Rev. Ed., 2012) (“In short, the ‘actual 
knowledge’ prong is reasonably construed to refer to specifics, whereas the 
‘red flag’ prong deals with generalities.”) (emphasis in original); Menell, 
Judicial Regulation of Digital Copyright Windfalls:  Making Interpretive and 
Policy Sense of Viacom v. YouTube and UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital 
Partners, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2049445 (May 1, 
2012).  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049445.  In addition to 
his position at UCLA School of Law, Professor Nimmer is “Of Counsel” to 
Irell & Manella, UMG’s counsel in this case.  The views articulated by 
Professor Nimmer in his treatise are his own, and not a result of his association 
with Irell & Manella. 
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The use of “infringing activity” in the “red flag” provision instead of 
“the material” clearly shows that Congress intended a different meaning – one 
that encompassed more than just knowledge of infringement of a specific 
copyrighted work.10  The Opinion ignores this clear distinction and instead 
endorses the Second Circuit’s view in Viacom that the “red flag” standard 
requires subjective awareness of facts that would have made the specific 
infringement objectively obvious to a reasonable person.11  But the Second 
Circuit’s “subjective/objective” formulation was fashioned largely from thin 
air12 and is refuted by the DMCA’s legislative history.  As Professor Nimmer 
commented:  
There are several problems with that resolution, posting 
[sic] that “actual knowledge” is subjective and “red flag” is 
objective.  First, the panel reached this conclusion not through 
                                           
10 See, e.g., SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a 
well-established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words 
or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a 
different meaning for those words.”). 
11 Opinion at 39-40; see also Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31. 
12 Ironically, to support its adoption of the “specificity” requirement for 
red flag knowledge, the Viacom court relied on and cited extensively to the 
now withdrawn original opinion in this case.  See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32.  
This circular reinforcement has led both circuits to reach the same erroneous 
interpretations of an important statutory provision, each relying on the other.  
Accordingly, the fact that the Opinion has now more aligned this circuit with 
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canons of statutory interpretation or adverting to other language 
used by the legislature, but instead by analyzing how “courts 
often invoke language.”  n.104.  Plainly, a missing step would 
be required to prove the point that Congress used the subject 
language in that same sense.  Second, nothing in the statutory 
language draws the distinction that [the Viacom] opinion 
derives.  In fact, one could, with equal if not more plausibility, 
posit the opposite--that “actual knowledge that the material ... is 
infringing” denotes objective facts in the world whereas 
“aware[ness] of facts” that make infringement “apparent” 
connotes a subjective perception!13   
The DMCA’s legislative history underscores the point.  There, when 
discussing Section 512 (including the provision that later became Section 
512(m)), Congress gave content to the “red flag” provision by noting that an 
ISP was not, in the first instance, required to search out “suspicious 
information.”14  Congress did not describe “red flag” knowledge as knowledge 
about a specific infringement.  Rather, it described it as “suspicious 
                                                                                                                                 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Viacom provides even more urgency to grant 
rehearing. 
13 3 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 12B.04[A][1][b] (Rev. Ed., 2012)  
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information.”15  This is a generalized standard.  Moreover, far from suggesting, 
as the Opinion held, that an ISP would never have an obligation to investigate 
infringement, Congress confirmed that while a provider might not have an 
obligation to seek out “red flags” in the first instance, once it acquired such 
“suspicious information,” it then had an obligation to investigate,16 stating that 
“[o]nce one becomes aware of such information, however, one may have an 
obligation to check further.”17 
Articulating the wrong standard in the Opinion led to the wrong result.  
When the District Court record is reviewed, unencumbered by the unduly 
restrictive view that Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) is limited to awareness of 
“specific instances of infringement,” it easily suffices to create a genuine issue 
                                                                                                                                 
14 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), 1998 WL 261605 at *26 (1998). 
15 Id. 
16 This Court’s prior decision in CCBill, on which the Opinion heavily 
relied, neither compels nor justifies the Opinion’s departure from the DMCA’s 
statutory language and structure.  CCBill considered whether a copyright 
owner’s alleged notice of infringement created knowledge on the part of an ISP 
where the copyright owner failed to comply with the requirements of Section 
512(c)(3).  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 
2007).  This Court’s discussion of burdens on the copyright owner in CCBill 
was in the context of preparing a notice that complied with Section 512(c)(3).  
This Court never even hinted that an ISP need not further investigate once 
aware of suspicious information.  That issue was never before the Court in 
CCBill, and the Opinion has simply ripped this conclusion from its proper 
context in CCBill in order to reach a result here contrary to clear legislative 
intent. 
17 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), 1998 WL 261605 at *26 (1998). 
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of fact as to Veoh’s “red flag” knowledge.  Infringement on Veoh was so 
obvious, even the New York Times was aware of it, as reflected in an article 
(circulated among Veoh executives) identifying Veoh as “host to a wide range 
of unauthorized and full-length copies of popular programs.”18  UMG also 
presented evidence that Veoh personnel reviewed the service on a daily basis, 
revealing videos that were clearly identified with specific copyright 
information, but turned a willfully blind eye to such infringements.19  And 
there was more -- the Opinion simply ignores the following exhibit in the 
record where a Veoh employee (charged with reviewing the Veoh service to 
find unauthorized material) wrote to his superior:  
“isn’t [infringing content] a majority of Veoh 
content?  . . .  And what should I do, for example, with music 
videos which are all copyrighted.” 
His superior responded:  
“You are correct, we have many unauthorized content, 
and we should use ‘unauthorized’ to describe them in any 
                                           
18 RE 1226-28. 
19 See, e.g., RE 951. 
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email or skype exchange.  I will explain you later on the 
phone, why and what to do with it.”20   
Thus, the evidence showed that Veoh was the type of site Congress 
described as a “pirate” site “where sound recordings, software, movies, or 
books were available for unauthorized downloading, public performance, or 
public display” and which required further investigation.21  But, because the 
Opinion, incorrectly extending CCBill, held that “red flag” knowledge 
demands proof of knowledge of specific instances of infringement, the Opinion 
treated all this evidence as irrelevant.22  Nothing in the DMCA or its legislative 
history supports such a counter-intuitive result. 
Contrasting the Opinion’s conclusions in this case with the analysis in 
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, __ F.3d __ (Case No. 10-55946) (9th Cir. 
March 21, 2013) (“Fung”) (argued to the same panel on the same day) reveals 
the incoherence of the Opinion’s construction of the DMCA.  Purporting to 
apply the same standards articulated in this case, the Fung Court ruled that 
                                           
20 RE 1233-34. 
21 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), 1998 WL 414916, at *57 (1998). 
22 At a minimum, Veoh’s failure to act in the face of this knowledge 
constitutes willful blindness.  Even under its incorrect standard, the Opinion 
acknowledges that “a service provider cannot willfully bury its head in the sand 
to avoid obtaining such specific knowledge.”  Opinion at 34.  Here, Veoh 
undisputedly did nothing even when it admitted knowledge that a majority of 
its content was infringing. 
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Fung’s hosting of indices of downloadable files, including infringing motion 
pictures, gave him “red flag” knowledge because “[t]he material in question 
was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively 
obvious to a reasonable person that the material solicited and assisted was both 
copyrighted and not licensed to random members of the public, and that the 
induced use was therefore infringing.”23  Here, UMG presented evidence that 
Veoh knowingly hosted and solicited music videos that were also well-known.  
Veoh’s own emails confirmed that it was objectively obvious to a reasonable 
person that such materials were copyrighted.  Moreover, the evidence showed 
that Veoh would have known it lacked a license to host such material because 
it had no license from any record company.24  The Opinion held this evidence 
did not confer “red flag” knowledge on Veoh, even though the same panel held 
that similar evidence conferred such knowledge in Fung. 
C. The Opinion misinterprets Section 512(c)(1)(B). 
The Opinion also erred when construing Section 512(c)(1)(B).  The 
Opinion took a straightforward provision that Congress explicitly drafted to 
                                           
23 Fung, slip. op. at 46. 
24 The Opinion repeats an error of the District Court in stating that Veoh 
had permission to host content from Sony Music.  Opinion at 30.  While Veoh 
had permission to link to Sony content on Sony’s own service, it had no 
license to actually host any such material on Veoh’s own computers.  See RE 
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mirror the common-law standard for vicarious liability and twisted it into 
something entirely different in order to reach a particular result.  In Section 
512(c)(1)(B), Congress deliberately copied the common-law standard for 
vicarious liability.  Any possible doubt about Congress’s intent is eliminated by 
the legislative history where Congress explicitly stated it was adopting the 
standard for vicarious liability:  “[t]he financial benefit standard in 
subparagraph (B) is intended to codify and clarify the direct financial benefit 
element of vicarious liability . . . .”25  It also stated that “[t]he ‘right and ability 
to control’ language in Subparagraph (B) codifies the second element of 
vicarious liability.”26 
When Congress adopts the language of a common-law standard, the 
Supreme Court holds that it intended to employ the meaning of that standard.27  
                                                                                                                                 
979-83.  For a discussion of the difference between linking and hosting on 
one’s own servers, see Fung, slip. op. at 5-9. 
25 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), at *25 (1998). 
26 Id., at *26.  The Opinion discounts these clear statements because they 
were not repeated with later versions of the bill that the panel asserts were 
different from the original.  Opinion at 44.  The language that became Section 
512(c)(1)(B), however, did not change in those later versions, and thus it is 
unsurprising that Congress did not repeat these statements in later reports.  
Moreover, CCBill, which the Opinion embraces on other points, unhesitatingly 
concludes that the DMCA did adopt the vicarious liability standard with 
respect to the “direct financial benefit” prong of 512(c)(1)(B).  See CCBill, 488 
F.3d at 1117. 
27 See, e.g., Needer v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999).   
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But, rather than adopting this obvious interpretation of Section 512(c)(1)(B), 
the Opinion holds that the “right and ability to control” requires a right and 
ability to control, plus something more.  But “something more” is nowhere to 
be found in the statutory language or legislative history, and was adopted from 
a totally separate standard for induced infringement.  The Opinion attempts to 
justify this addition of a new element by pointing to statements in the 
legislative history that Section 512 was, in a general sense, intended to protect 
against liability for both direct and secondary infringement in narrow 
circumstances.28  But this language in the legislative history was not even 
directed to Section 512(c) specifically, but to the DMCA more generally.  The 
Opinion incorrectly relies on a generalized legislative goal to override the 
specific language actually enacted and the clear explanation of its meaning. 
The Opinion also justifies its added element by reasoning that Congress 
could not have possibly meant what it said because that would somehow 
swallow up the entire “safe harbor.”29  This concern is misplaced and, again, 
the Opinion’s reasoning fundamentally flawed.  An ISP that is not deriving a 
direct financial benefit from infringing activity would not lose protection from 
the “safe harbor.”  But, when an ISP monetizes the infringing activity, as Veoh 
                                           
28 Opinion at 44. 
29 See, e.g., Opinion at 43. 
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did, Congress intended to hold them responsible for their infringement.  The 
Opinion never substantively discusses the direct financial benefit prong.30  
The error of the Opinion’s statutory interpretation again becomes clear 
when contrasted with Fung.  There, the defendant maintained a “torrent site” 
containing “torrent files” that provide the instructions for obtaining files 
available on a BitTorrent system.31  Sites like Fung’s contain only torrent files, 
“no copyrighted material resides on these sites.”32  Neither Fung (nor 
computers or sites operated by Fung) performed the infringing copying and 
distribution of copyrighted works.  Those acts were conducted by users of 
Fung’s sites.33  Nevertheless, this Court concluded that Fung had a right and 
ability to control infringing activity because he had engaged in conduct that 
induced other, unnamed third parties, to engage in direct infringement. 
Here, Veoh did the direct infringement itself.  Unlike Fung, Veoh made 
unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted works; Veoh took possession of 
those unauthorized reproductions and kept them on computers owned and 
                                           
30 In Fung, the Court held that “the structure of § 512(c)(1)(B) indicates 
that the lack of direct financial benefit prong of the safe harbor requirement is 
central rather than peripheral . . . . The grammatical emphasis, then, is on the 
lack of direct financial benefit requirement, with the right to control prong 
secondary.”  Fung, slip. op. at 49-50. 
31 See generally Fung, slip. op. at 9-14. 
32 Id. at 12. 
33 Id. at 9-14. 
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controlled by Veoh; and Veoh engaged in the direct unauthorized display, 
performance and distribution of those copyrighted works by transmitting them 
either as streams, or as permanent downloads.  Nonetheless, the Opinion held 
that Veoh – despite its undeniably greater exercise of control over every aspect 
of infringement than Fung – lacked the right and ability to control its own 
infringing activity.  This inconsistency illustrates the fundamental flaw in the 
Opinion’s attempt to graft an inducement standard onto the “right and ability to 
control.”   
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